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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

*
*

v.

*

AARON T. BRANDLEY,

*

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Case No. 970421-CA

*

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred upon the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
POINT I
Should the Per Se Reversal rule in State v. Brown apply
to privately retained counsel?
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will uphold the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial unless it
determines the trial court has abused its discretion.
Boone, 820 P.2d 930 (Utah App. 1991).
POINT II
Has Appellant failed to establish a conflict of
interest that resulted in actual prejudice?

1

State v.

Standard of Review: Findings of Fact are reviewed by an appellate
court under the clearly erroneous standard.

State v. Pena, 8 69

P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) .
POINT III
Were the statements of Appellant given to the
investigating officer involuntary and in violation of
his rights?
Standard of Review: Findings of Fact are reviewed by an appellate
court under the clearly

erroneous

standard.

State v. Pena, 8 69

P.2d 932 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
All relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules
are referenced in Appellant's brief and addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted by jury trial of five counts of
Gross Lewdness, each a class A misdemeanor.

The crimes were

alleged to have occurred in Clearfield City, Davis County.
Appellant was represented by privately retained trial counsel.
Prior to trial Appellant moved to suppress statements made
to a police detective.

The motion was denied and. the court made

written findings of fact.
After trial but before sentencing, Appellant discharged his
attorney and through his current appellate counsel moved for a
new trial based on Appellant's discovery that his trial counsel
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had associates in his law office who had prosecutorial functions
in Uinta City, Weber County.

The motion for new trial was denied

and the court again made written findings of fact.

This appeal

was taken seeking a reversal of Appellant's convictions based on
the same issues raised in the two motions.
Appellant was a student teacher at Clearfield High School.
At the trial five teenage high school females testified that a
clean-cut young adult male touched them in the crotch area while
walking in the halls.

Each witness identified the Appellant in

court as being the one who touched her (R. 154, 198, 223,255,
277) .
The statements that Appellant sought to have suppressed
consisted of a response when the detective told him five high
school girls had identified him as the person who had touched
them.

Appellant's response was that he didn't believe there had

been five (R. 288, 291). The officer described the touching as
having "scooped" them.

When Appellant said he didn't scoop them,

the detective said "I didn't mean scooped, I mean that your, that
the hand was in a scoop position."

Appellant said that was

possible (R.288, 289). The detective asked Appellant why he had
done it and he replied he didn't know but that he knew it had to
stop (R.289).
The Detective's interview took place in the office in the
front of the school (R. 12).

The room was about 10 by 12 feet

3

(R.12).

Appellant was accompanied to the room by an

administrator who introduced him to the detective (R.13).
administrator left the room closing the door.

Appellant was

seated closer to the door than the Appellant (R.13).
was not locked (R.13).
minutes (R. 15,367).

The

The door

The interview lasted ten to fifteen
The officer never raised his voice,

displayed handcuffs, gun or badge, though he did identify himself
as a police officer (R.18).

Appellant provided an affidavit

describing the officer's interrogation:
The officer said words to the effect that scooping was
not a big deal, "you can tell me about what you did,"
that when I was in school we called scooping a "cheap
feel." He acted like he was my friend, so I should
confide in him that I had touched the young women.
(Affidavit paragraph 8 ) .
The detective had not focused his investigation on the
Appellant at the time of the interview.

He had spoken to another

officer over the phone about the incident but had not interviewed
any of the girls (R.10).

He understood that four of the girls

had identified a student teacher as the suspect and a fifth had
specifically identified Appellant (R. 25). The detective's mind
was still open at the time to looking at other teachers or people
(R.19).
For purposes of Appellant's motion for new trial, the
prosecution stipulated that trial counsel's associates were
prosecutors in Uinta City
about South Weber City.

(R. 444).

There is no stipulation

Nor is there any evidence that the Court
4

or the prosecutor were aware of the conflict at the time of the
trial.

The only evidence that Trial counsel knew of his

associates conflict is the statement given by Appellate counsel
at the time of the motion hearing (R 444).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Appellant's privately retained counsel did not
disclose to appellant, the court or the prosecutor that members
of his firm performed prosecutorial functions in a small city in
another county.

The Per Se reversal rule of State v. Brown, 853

P.2d 851 should not apply to this circumstance because it is a
circumstance that was not avoidable by the prosecution or the
court.

Imposition of the Per Se rule therefore would have no

prophylactic effect unless courts made an on the record inquiry
into the potential conflicts of every defense attorney in every
case.
Point II: The court heard appellants motion for a new trial
and found that he had not been prejudiced by the conflict and
that Defense Counsel's performance had been vigorous and
effective.

The appellate court should defer to those findings.

Point III: The court heard Appellant's motion to suppress
his statements made to a police officer without a Miranda
warning.

The court made findings of fact that the statements

were voluntary and defendant was not in custody nor were the
statements made under circumstances requiring Miranda.

5

The

appellate court should defer to those findings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PER SE REVERSAL RULE IN STATE V. BROWN SHOULD NOT
APPLY TO PRIVATELY RETAINED COUNSEL.
Defendant relies principally upon the case of State v.
Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (1992).

Brown is limited in scope to public

defender representation:
Thus, it is clear that conflicts of interest inhere
whenever a city prosecutor is appointed
to represent an
indigent
defendant.
Brown at 858 (emphasis added).
The stated purpose of the court creating a per se rule of
reversal is to create a prophylactic rule to prevent government
from contracting with appointed counsel that also do prosecution
work.

The per se rule would be ineffective in preventing private

counsel from representing both defendants and prosecution
agencies.
Consequently, we hold that defendant's right to the
undivided loyalty of counsel was jeopardized. Because
a concrete showing of prejudice would be very difficult
to make when a prosecutor is appointed
to assist in the
defense of the accused, we conclude that it is
unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case
inquiry to weigh actual prejudice. Instead, we
announce a per se rule of reversal wherever such a dual
representation is undertaken so as to prevent
its
recurrence.
Brown at 859 (emphasis added).
A subsequent case, State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350 (Utah
1996), reiterates the limitation "...our decision in Brown
announced for the first time that counsel with concurrent
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prosecutorial duties could not represent indigent
Gordon at 354 (emphasis added).

defendants..."

That case further emphasized the

prophylactic purpose behind the ruling, M(t)he primary purpose of
the prohibition in Brown was clearly prophylactic..."

Gordon at

354.
The court in Gordon emphasized that Brown represented an
exercise of the court's supervisory power over the trial court.
The record is totally devoid of any evidence that either the
court or the prosecutor had any knowledge that defense counsel
had associates with prosecutorial duties.

A rule of per se

reversal applied to those circumstances makes no sense.

Neither

the court nor the prosecutor could have foreseen or avoided the
conflict absent a blanket requirement for an inquiry into all
conflicts of each and every private defense attorney prior to
trial.
Although trial courts need not investigate every
possible nuance surrounding a potential conflict of
interest, nor do they have an affirmative duty to
initiate an investigation into such matters when not
raised, when an issue is raised, the court must make
sufficient investigation to adequately ascertain that
no material conflict exists. State v. Velarde, 806
P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991).
This court has held in a dual representation case, which is
a more direct conflict of interest than seen here, that the per
se rule does not apply if the trial court could not have
reasonably known about the conflict:

7

Although his motion for new trial could be regarded as
sufficient to preserve for consideration in this direct
appeal his ineffectiveness of counsel claim arising
from counsel's representation of purportedly
conflicting interests (citations omitted), it was
untimely for purposes of invoking the Holloway
automatic reversal rule, which is based on a trial
judge's failure to act once on notice that there was a
possible conflict of interests between jointly
represented codefendants. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65
at 75 (Utah App. 1990) referencing
Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426
(1978).
In Webb this court held:
...the record in this case discloses an insufficient
basis on which to hold that the trial court reasonably
should have known before or at trial that the two SLLDA
attorneys were representing codefendants with
conflicting interests. We therefore conclude that the
sixth amendment imposed no affirmative duty on the
trial judge to act sua sponte and appoint Webb a nonSLLDA attorney or inquire into the propriety of the
representation of the codefendants by two public
defenders from the same office. Webb at 75.
Appellant argues that because trial counsel's representation
of appellant violated an advisory opinion of the State Bar, the
per se rule should apply.

The Court of Appeals has held that a

conflict of interest in a criminal case does not result in an
automatic reversal, but results in a cause for disciplinary
proceedings by the bar:
In State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397 (Utah App. 1990). This
court said that a criminal defendant "is not
automatically entitled to a reversal of his conviction"
merely because of an apparent violation of a rule of
professional conduct. Id. At 400. If Farr violated
any ethical rules, the "appropriate remedy lies with
the disciplinary arm of the Utah State Bar." State v.
Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah 1992).

8

Defendant relies on an advisory opinion of the Ethics
Advisory Opinion Committee of the Utah State Bar.

A review of

the Rules of Procedure of the committee reveals that such
opinions "...may not be binding on the Utah Supreme Court or
other courts of law."

Paragraph VIII.

The opinion therefore should not be viewed as
persuasive authority on the issue of whether a per se reversal is
appropriate.

Such weight was neither intended not contemplated

in the issuance of the opinion.

POINT II
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY CONFLICT IN
INTEREST THAT RESULTED IN ACTUAL PREJUDICE.

The court in Gordon pointed out the difference between the
alleged conflict in this case

and the direct conflict that

arises by one attorney representing to defendants with
conflicting defenses:
The dissent relies upon cases in which the conflict of
interest arose out of joint representation of multiple
defendants, where, for example, one codefendant elected
to plead guilty and testify against another. See
State
v. Smith,
621 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1980). This
represents a direct conflict of interest. However, the
conflict of interest faced by an appointed defense
counsel who also has concurrent prosecutorial duties in
another jurisdiction is much more remote. Here, where
Gordon was convicted in a trial conducted before we
issued Brown, we should require Gordon to show
ineffective assistance of his defense attorney.
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(Citation omitted) This represents a direct conflict of
interest. However, the conflict of interest faced by
an appointed defense counsel who also has concurrent
prosecutorial duties in another jurisdiction is much
more remote. Gordon at 355.
The court then went on to outline the proper standard of
review:
To demonstrate that his defense counsel's assistance
was so inadequate as to constitute lack of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment, Gordon must show that (1)
his counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2)
he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. State
v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113-14 (Utah 1994) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-94, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). These factors are
not applied as a mechanical test but are meant to help
us answer the ultimate questions of whether the
"defendant received a fair trial." State v. Frame, 723
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) .
Appellant in this case has elected not to make an attempt to
show the second prong in a

Strickland analysis.

that no prejudice needs to be shown.

He argues only

Yet even the case Appellant

cites as authority requires a showing that the conflict adversely
affected his counsel's performance.
A defendant who did not object to the conflict at trial
has the burden on appeal of demonstrating with
specificity that "an actual conflict of interest
existed which adversely affected his (or her) lawyer's
performance." State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 (Utah
App. 1991).
Other cases point to an appellant's burden to show an
impairment of his interests:
To succeed on a claim of conflict of interest,
defendant must "point to specific instances in the
record to suggest an actual conflict or impairment of
10

his or her interests." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 75
(Utah App. 1990). Defendant cannot claim error based
on the mere appearance or hypothetical existence of
conflict. Id. State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 212(Utah
App. 1991).
The trial court below heard the evidence at trial and found
as a finding of fact that Appellant was well represented and was
not prejudiced by the fact that his attorney had associates who
represented a city in another county as city prosecutors.

That

finding should not be disturbed by this court absent a finding of
clear error.
POINT III.
THIS COURT SHOULD GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT
FINDING THAT THE STATEMENTS OF APPELLANT WERE VOLUNTARY
AND NOT IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS.
The Utah Supreme Court set the standard for determining
whether an investigative interview required a Miranda warning in
State v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983):
The court in State v. Riffle, 131 Ariz. 65, 638 P.2d
732 (1981), restated four of the most important factors
in determining whether an accused who has not been
formally arrested is in custody. They are: (1) the
site of the investigation; (2) whether the
investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the
objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the
length and form of interrogation. earner at 1171.
The trial court in this case was fully briefed on the earner
standards and cited to them in its written Memorandum of
Decision:
In this case the Court makes the following findings:
(1) That the site of Defendant's interrogation was
friendly, not hostile. It was the place where he
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worked. His administrative superior asked him to come
to a room at the school, and he came voluntarily.
(2) That although the investigation had focused to some
degree on Defendant, it had not, until the conclusion
of the interrogation, progressed to the point that the
police had probable cause to arrest him.
(3) That objective indicia of arrest were almost
totally absent. The officer was in civilian clothes,
had a badge on his belt that may or may not have been
seen by Defendant, had no handcuffs and his gun was not
visible. The door was not locked. Defendant was one
on one with the officer.
(4) That the interrogation was brief, lasting
approximately 15 minutes. It was casual and
conversational rather than accusatory or threatening.
The Defendant's characterization of the interview was
that the officer tried to inveigle, cajole and
persuade. There is no claim that he was overbearing or
intimidating.
Those findings are supported by the evidence and this court
should defer to those findings absent a showing of clear error
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court
under the clearly erroneous standard. For a reviewing
court to find clear error, it must decide that the
factual findings made by the trial court are not
adequately supported by the record, resolving all
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to
the trial court's determination. Pena at 935-936.
(Citations omitted).
Even if the court finds the trial court erred in refusing to
suppress the statements made to the detective, any such error was
harmless in view of the strength of the State's evidence.

In

this case the State had five witnesses who testified to five
independent incidents and all five identified the Appellant as
the perpetrator.
"An erroneous decision by a trial court cannot result
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in reversible error unless the error is harmful." State
v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997).
"Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood
that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. Put
differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood
of a different outcome is sufficiently high that it
undermines our confidence Tin the verdict." Id. State
v. Piansiaksone, 337 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 1998).
CONCLUSION
Appellant received a fair trial free from violation of his
right to effective counsel.

Appellant's convictions should

therefore be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the ,-~J/

day of June, 1998.

M

J. /Namba
Deputy^Bavis County Attorney
Attorney for Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee, with postage prepaid thereon, to
Kent E. Snider, Attorney for Appellant, at 2564 Washington Blvd.,
Ogden, UT 84401, this <^??^day of June, 1998.

Secretary
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ADDENDUM

MICHAEL V. HOUTZ, #5854
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES
AMERICA FIRST BUILDING
4768 HARRISON BOULEVARD
OGDEN, UTAH 84403
TELEPHONE: (801)479-4777
IN THE LAYTON CIRCUIT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF AARON BRANDLEY
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No.: 961000783
AARON BRANDLEY,
Judge Roger K. Bean
Defendant.
County of Weber
State of Utah

)
:ss
)

1.

I am the Defendant in the above entitled matter•

2.

On April 2, 1996,

I was in my school room preparing for

the day at Clearfield High School.

I was a student teacher at the

school.
3.

A school administrator came to the room and asked if I

had a few minutes to go with him.

I told him I was preparing for

the day but I would go with him for a few minutes.
4.

At no time did the school administrator tell me why he

wanted me or who I was going to see.

5.
go in.

The school administrator took me to his office and had me
The person in the office closed the door and identified

himself as a police officer, Inspector Holthaus.

There was no

other person in the room with us.
6.

He then asked me if I knew why I was asked to come and

speak with him.

I told him I did not know.

He told me that five

girls at Clearfield high had been touched in their groin area and
they identified me as the person who "scooped" them.
7.

I denied any involvement, and I told him I had no idea

what scooped meant.

The police officer got up out of the chair and

showed me what scooping was and told me that a law had been passed
recently in Davis County prohibiting scooping.

I indicated that I

had never done such a thing to anyone in my life.
8.

The officer said words to the effect that scooping was

not a big or bad deal, "you can tell me about what you did," that
when I was in school we called scooping a "cheap feel."

He acted

like he was my friend, so I should confide in him that I had
touched the young women.
9.

I told him I had never in my life touched anybody in that

manner.
10.

The officer then asked if I ever intentionally touched

the five female students in an inappropriate manner.

I told him I

had not.
11.

The officer then asked me how I walk and

questioned

whether I walk with my arms swinging.

I said that I did walk with

my arms swinging but so does every other person.
12.
students.

The officer asked if I unintentionally brushed by the
I indicated that the halls are crowded, and it is

possible that I unintentionally could have brushed against any
student in the school when the halls are crowded.
13.

The officer then stood up and told me I had been very

cooperative. He opened the door for me to leave.

He briefly said

something to the school administrator and left.
14.

The school administrator asked if I had any personal

belongings in the school. I had my lunch there. He took me to get
my lunch and requested that I leave the school grounds.
15.

Several days later I learned that the police officer said

I had confessed to crimes alleged in this case.
16.

I never did.

I was never given Miranda warnings at any time during the

interrogation by the police officer.
DATED this

H

day of August, 1996.

CU jQtr
fron B r a n d l e y ,
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s

\°\

1996.
Na
otary

K,

•X"v;:r^

••'""•VTS.OT I T A H

I

Public

Defendant
d a y of

August,

MAILING CERTIFICATE
On this

day of August, 1996, I deposited in the U.S,

Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Aaron
Brandley to the following:
Layton Circuit Court
Clerk of the Court
425 North Wasatch Drive
Layton UT 84040
Brian Namba
Davis County Attorney's Office
800 West State Street
Farmington UT 84025

Tauna I. Mazeika
Legal Secretary

SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF U T A H
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

AARON T. BRANDLEY.
Defendant

MATTER:

Case No.

961000783

Date

10-25-96

Judge

Bean

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

From a review of the testimony of Inspector Holthaus and Defendant's affidavit
testimony, the Court concludes that the officer's questioning of Defendant was not
custodial, and denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
In Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 6 6 4 P.2d 11 68 (Utah 1983), the Court quoted w i t h
approval from t w o Arizona cases. In referring to the first, State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz.
App. 2 5 1 , 431 P.2d 6 9 1 , 25 A.L.R. 3d 1063 (1967), it said:
. . . the court opted for the rule that the Miranda warning need
not be given until police have both reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been committed and also reasonable
grounds to believe that the defendant committed it. Said the
court:
We believe that the point where the warning must be
given is when the t w o generally coincide, for from that
point forward the police can be expected to pursue the
case against the defendant w i t h vigor. The police must
have focused generally upon the crime so that they
would have caused [sic] for arrest without a warrant.

2
. . . The time for caution is when the arrest could be
made. Everything prior to that time may be considered
"the general on the scene questioning" which is
permissible under Miranda.
In referring to the second, the Court said:
The court in State v. Riffle, 131 Ariz. 65, 638 P.2d 7 3 2
(1981), restated four of the most important factors in
determining whether an accused who has not been formally
arrested is in custody. They are: (1) the site of interrogation;
(2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3)
whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the
length and form of interrogation. Applying that test to the
instant case, the field sobriety tests were requested and taken
on a public street. Moreover, no indicia of arrest such as
readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns were present
when the officer asked the defendant to perform the field
sobriety tests. Also, the length of the performance of the tests
was only minutes, a relatively short period of time. These
factors do not suggest a custodial setting. The environment
may have been authoritative but it certainly was not coercive or
compelling.
In State v. Mirquet, 9 1 4 P.2d 1 1 4 4 , (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court,
quoting w i t h approval from Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 4 2 0 , 4 4 0 , 82 L. Ed. 2d
3 1 7 , 104 S. Ct. 3 1 3 8 , said:
The standard for determining when a defendant is "in
custody" for Miranda purposes is well-settled. "[T]he
safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as
a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree
associated with formal arrest.'" Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 4 4 0
(quoting California v. Beheler, 4 6 3 U.S. 1 1 2 1 , 1125, 77 L. Ed.
2d 1275, 103 S. Ct. 3 5 1 7 (1983) (per curiam)); see also State
v. East, 743 P.2d 1 2 1 1 , 1212 (Utah 1987). More specifically,
Miranda warnings are required whenever the circumstances of
an interrogation are such that they "exert[] upon [the] detained
person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his
privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned
of his constitutional rights." Berkemer, 4 6 8 U.S. at 4 3 7 , 104
S.Ct. at 3 1 4 9 .
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In this case, the Court makes these findings:
(1) That the site of Defendant's interrogation was friendly, not hostile. It was
the place where he worked. His administrative superior asked him to come to
a room at the school, and he came voluntarily.
(2) That although the investigation had focused to some degree on Defendant,
it had not, until the conclusion of the interrogation, progressed to the point
that the police had probable cause to arrest him.
(3) That objective indicia of arrest were almost totally absent. The officer
was in civilian clothes, had a badge on his belt that may or may not have been
seen by Defendant, had no handcuffs and his gun was not visible. The door
was not locked. Defendant was one on one with the officer.
(4) That the interrogation was brief, lasting approximately 15 minutes. It was
casual and conversational rather than accusatory or threatening. The
Defendant's characterization of the interview was that the officer tried
to inveigle, cajole and persuade. There is no claim that he was overbearing or
intimidating.
The police did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Defendant was the one
who committed the offense until Defendant had responded to the questions put to
him in the interrogation.
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DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

The basis of Defendant's Motion is that the lawyer he retained to represent him at
trial was a member of a firm that employed t w o other lawyers who were part time
prosecutors for the Town of Uintah. Defendant argues that this is an obvious
conflict of interest which necessitates setting aside his conviction and granting a
new trial.
Defendant brings his Motion under Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which reads:
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new
trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
Rule 30(a) of the Criminal Rules is also pertinent:
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.
Defendant's principal reliance is on State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992),
which held that court-appointed defense counsel who was also a part-time
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prosecutor in a different jurisdiction constituted an inherent conflict of interest
requiring reversal. The Utah Supreme Court said:
Although we do not decide whether it is constitutionally
impermissible to appoint a city attorney with prosecutorial
responsibilities to represent an indigent defendant, we conclude
that vital interests of the criminal justice system are jeopardized
when a city prosecutor is appointed to assist in the defense of
an accused. Consequently, we hold that as a matter of public
policy and pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the
courts, counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may
not be appointed to defend indigent persons; therefore, we
reverse defendant's conviction and order a new trial.
In a later case, State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996), the Court
characterized the Brown decision thus:
Furthermore, our decision in Brown announced for the first time
that counsel with concurrent prosecutorial duties could not
represent indigent defendants, a clear change from past
procedures.
In Brown, we expressly declined to decide whether the
appointment of attorneys with concurrent prosecutor/a/ duties
was constitutionally impermissible
The primary purpose of the prohibition in Brown was clearly
prophylactic, that is, to forbid "such dual representation . . . so
as to prevent its recurrence." (All emphases added),
The reasons given by the Court for its decision in Brown are not present in this
case. Counsel was appointed to represent an indigent defendant there; Defendant
chose and retained his own counsel here. Appointed counsel had concurrent
prosecutorial obligations there; Mr. Houtz had no prosecutorial function here.
Hesitation to vigorously cross examine police officers, a "natural inclination not to
anger the very individuals whose assistance (a prosecutor) relies upon in carrying
out his prosecutorial responsibilities," reluctance to attack the constitutionality of
the very laws he has sworn to uphold as a prosecutor, unconscious influences that
may affect the judgment of an attorney with such concurrent commitments -- all
these underlying reasons discussed by the Court in Brown are not present here.
Even in a multiple representation case, where there is ever present the possibility
that a conflict of interest may arise, ". . . until a defendant shows that his counsel
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actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional
predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 4 4 6 U.S. 335
(1980).
If a court is put on notice of a probable risk of conflict of interest and then fails to
appoint separate counsel, a defendant is deprived of his constitutionally guaranteed
assistance of counsel. "Absent these special circumstances, however, a defendant
can prevail on a conflict of interest ineffectiveness of counsel claim only by
demonstrating an actual conflict which affected his or her attorney's performance."
State v. Newman, 9 2 8 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1996), citing State v. Webb, 7 9 0
P.2d 65 (Utah App. 1990). In Webb, the Court said, "In order to show an actual
conflict of interest existed, a defendant must point to specific instances in the
record to suggest an actual conflict or impairment of his or her interests. (Citations
omitted). There is no violation where the conflict is irrelevant or merely
hypothetical; there must be an actual, significant conflict."
The foregoing references and quotes are from cases in which counsel represented
more than one defendant in charges arising out of the same incident. It is apparent
to the Court that the potential for conflict is greater in such cases than in the
present case. It is a fortiori, then, that if a claimed conflict is irrelevant or merely
hypothetical in those cases unless there is a showing of actual conflict, it is
irrelevant or merely hypothetical here.
The Court denies Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. The Court apologizes to
counsel for the time it has taken to get this decision worked up and mailed out.

/Judge

